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In United States v. Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit upheld a 
defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for 
transmitting a threat through interstate commerce after the 
defendant posted a music video on YouTube. The video 
threatened a local judge presiding over the defendant’s 
child custody proceedings. Circuits have split on whether  
§ 875(c) and other similar federal threat statutes require 
the defendant to possess a subjective intent to threaten. 
This Article argues that the “true threat” test courts use to 
apply § 875(c) essentially incorporates a subjective intent 
to threaten. The Article then applies the subjective intent 
requirement to YouTube videos, using the reasoning in 
United States v. Alkhabaz as a model. 
  
* Pedro Celis, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2014. 
Thank you to Professors Robert Gomulkiewicz and James Hardisty of the 
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When does a YouTube video constitute a criminal threat? The 
Sixth Circuit recently held that a defendant who posted an original 
music video on YouTube violated a federal threat statute.1 The 
video contained threatening comments directed at a local judge, 
and referenced the defendant’s upcoming court date in a custody 
case. Lyrics in the video included “take my child and I’ll take your 
life” and “July the 14th is the last time I'm goin' to court.”2 The 
court upheld the defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 
which criminalizes conveying a threat to injure or kidnap a person 
through interstate commerce.3 
1  United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 59, 187 L. Ed. 2d 25 (2013). 
2 Id. at 475–76. 
3 Id. at 483. 
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Using § 875(c) to prosecute threats made in YouTube videos 
raises interesting First Amendment concerns. Unlike other 
interstate communications, such as telephone calls, YouTube 
videos and similar posts on other forms of social media are 
generally not directed at specific individuals. Thus, an application 
of criminal liability to YouTube videos may have a particularly 
chilling effect on public speech. 
This Article argues that a YouTube video can only constitute a 
“true threat” if its creator had a subjective intent to threaten. 
Subjective intent to threaten is demonstrated by evidence that the 
video was disseminated to the threatened individual or that the 
threat was made to further a purpose through intimidation. 
Requiring subjective intent reduces the potential chilling effect of 
§ 875(c) by ensuring that only threats directed at specific 
individuals or groups are subject to liability. 
  
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REQUISITE MENS REA 
FOR 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) 
 
The text of § 875(c) contains no language about the requisite 
mens rea. The statute provides: “whoever transmits in interstate or 
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.”4 Despite this broad language, courts have not 
interpreted § 875(c) as a strict liability offense, noting the 
absurdity of the results and the general common law preference for 
mens rea requirements in criminal statutes.5 
4 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). Under a plain language interpretation, 
YouTube could face liability for “transmit[ting]” a threat uploaded by a user. 
The First Amendment, however, prohibits strict liability for statutes 
criminalizing speech. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154–55, 80 S. Ct. 
215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959) (holding a statute imposing strict liability on 
booksellers for possessing obscene material impermissibly chilled protected 
speech). 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(“although section 875(c) contains no explicit mens rea element, the statute is 
not … a strict liability offense.”); United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 
782 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 
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Although courts agree that a violation of § 875(c) is not a strict 
liability offense, they disagree about the requisite mens rea. Courts 
have addressed two questions about § 875(c)’s mens rea 
requirements. The first is whether the defendant must intend to 
carry out the threat or simply intend to make the threat. Courts 
have held that only intent to threaten is required, or conversely that 
intent to carry out the threat is not required.6 
The second mens rea issue is whether the intent to threaten 
must be objective or subjective. Phrased differently, the issue is 
whether the communication must be a threat when viewed from the 
perspective of the defendant (subjective intent) or from the 
perspective of a reasonable person (objective intent). Currently, 
only the Ninth Circuit requires subjective intent.7 Other circuits 
require only objective intent.8 However, some circuits, such as the 
Sixth Circuit, functionally require subjective intent through the 
application of the true threat test. 
The use of differing terminology further complicates the 
disagreement among the circuits. Courts frame the mens rea issues 
described above using the terms “general intent,” “specific intent,” 
“subjective intent,” and “objective intent.”9 These terms are used 
interchangeably, with “general intent” being synonymous with 
1992) (transmission of threat cannot be inadvertent).  
6 See, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478; United States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 
379, 381 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th 
Cir. 1978). 
7 See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 
1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a conviction required both objective and 
subjective intent in a case involving statements that encouraged killing Barack 
Obama, then a presidential candidate, that were posted in an online forum). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that § 875(c) only requires the defendant to intentionally send communication, 
not intentionally threaten); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that objective test measures whether a reasonable observer would find 
the communication conveyed intent to cause harm); United States v. Alkhabaz, 
104 F.3d 1493, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a subjective standard). 
9 Karen Rosenfield, Note, Redefining the Question: Applying a 
Hierarchical Structure to the Mens Rea Requirement for Section 875(c), 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1846 (2008). 
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“objective intent,” and “specific intent” with “subjective intent.”10 
For the sake of clarity, this Article will only use the terms 
“subjective intent” and “objective intent.”  
 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT § 875(C) APPLY 
ONLY TO “TRUE THREATS” 
 
The Supreme Court has held that threat statutes criminalize 
pure speech.11 Therefore, § 875(c) “must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.”12 Threats are 
one of the limited categories of pure speech that the First 
Amendment does not protect.13 However, a statute prohibiting 
threats must distinguish true threats from “constitutionally 
protected speech.”14 A statute that does not make this distinction 
chills protected speech through the threat of prosecution.15 
First Amendment analysis of criminal threat statutes hinges on 
whether the prohibited speech is a true threat.16 For a threat to be a 
true threat, it must “communicate a serious expression of an intent 
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or 
group of individuals.”17  
Various circuit courts have further developed the true threat 
test in the context of § 875(c) and related federal statutes. This test 
essentially incorporates the subjective intent test applied by the 
Ninth Circuit. This incorporation of subjective intent is evident 
from comparing two cases in the Sixth Circuit. 
 
 
10 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 485 (Sutton, J., dubitante) (citing DeAndino, 958 
F.2d at 148). 
11 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L. Ed. 2d 
664 (1969). 
12 Id.  
13 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 
535 (2003). 
14 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. 
15 Black, 538 U.S. at 365.  
16 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60. 
17 Black, 538 U.S. at 359. 
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III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND TRUE THREAT ANALYSIS 
 
The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejects any subjective intent 
requirement under § 875(c).18 However, the circuit applies a true 
threat analysis in all § 875(c) cases.19 This analysis incorporates 
subjective features. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of § 
875(c) is functionally identical to the Ninth Circuit’s approach. 
Comparing the cases United States v. Jeffries and United States v. 
Alkhabaz demonstrates this. 
 
A.  United States v. Jeffries 
 
In Jeffries, the defendant filmed himself performing an original 
song entitled “Daughter’s Love,” and uploaded the video to 
YouTube. The song described Jeffries’ relationship with his 
daughter and his ongoing legal dispute over visitation rights. 
Jeffries created the video shortly before a hearing to determine 
whether his unsupervised visits should continue. The song 
contained several passages apparently aimed at the judge who was 
presiding over the custody case and referenced the defendant’s 
upcoming hearing. Among these passages was the following: 
Take my child and I'll take your life. I'm not 
kidding, judge, you better listen to me. I killed a 
man downrange in war. I have nothing against you, 
but I'm tellin' you this better be the last court date  
. . . so July the 14th is the last time I'm goin' to 
court. Believe that. Believe that, or I'll come after 
you after court. Believe that.  
Jeffries ended the video by looking into the camera and stating 
I can shoot you. I can kill you. I can f____ you. Be 
my friend. Do something right. Serve my daughter. 
Yeah, look at that, that's the evil. You better keep 
me on God's side. Do the right thing July 14th.  
18 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997). 
19 United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012); Alkhabaz, 
104 F.3d at 1496. 
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After uploading the video, the defendant sent links to the video 
to several people involved with the case, encouraging them to 
share the video with “the Judge.” After the jury convicted Jeffries 
of violating § 875(c), he appealed on the grounds that the trial 
judge had refused to instruct the jury on a subjective intent 
requirement. The Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court’s instruction, 
holding that the only requirement was that a reasonable observer 
would consider the threat a true threat. 
 
B.  United States v. Alkhabaz 
 
In an earlier case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an 
indictment where the defendant had exchanged several emails with 
another unknown defendant.20 The emails discussed a shared 
sexual interest in torture and rape.21 The case involved a fictional 
story that the defendant Alkhabaz wrote about the rape and murder 
of one of his classmates.22 Alkhabaz emailed the story to the other 
defendant and also posted the story to a Usenet group called 
alt.sex.stories.23 Alkhabaz did not attempt to send the story to the 
classmate about whom he wrote the story. However, another 
classmate saw the story and reported it to the school authorities 
who began the investigation.  
The case was appealed after the district court dismissed the 
indictment on First Amendment grounds for failing to allege a true 
threat.24 The Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the 
communication was not a true threat, although ostensibly doing so 
on statutory grounds, rather than basing its holding on the First 
Amendment.25 
The court held that § 875(c) required that the threat be made 
“to effect some change or achieve some goal through 
intimidation.”26 Even if a reasonable observer could find that the 
20 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997). 




25 Id. at 1496. 
26 Id. at 1495. 
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story was a “serious expressio[n] of an intention to inflict bodily 
harm,” the story was not meant to use intimidation to further that 
purpose.27 Instead, the story was sent “to foster a friendship based 
on shared sexual fantasies.”28 
 
C.  Distinguishing Alkhabaz from Jeffries 
 
Alkhabaz and Jeffries shared several important features, yet 
produced different results. Posting a fictional story to a Usenet 
group is in many respects similar to posting a video on YouTube. 
Both were posted on publicly accessible parts of the Internet.29 
Moreover, both forms of communication differed from emails and 
phone calls in that they do not inherently target specific recipients. 
In the abstract, the cases involved similar communications. 
It is the subjective purpose behind each communication that 
differentiates Alkhabaz from Jeffries. Two key facts in Jeffries led 
the court to consider the YouTube video a true threat, unlike the 
story in Alkhabaz. First, while Alkhabaz merely posted his story 
without attempting to specifically communicate it to the threatened 
individual, Jeffries posted his video and then sent links to several 
people involved with the case. This fact by itself might not have 
been determinative, as the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected a test 
based on whether the threat was communicated to the threatened 
party.30 However, the fact that Jeffries made an effort to 
communicate with the judge was evidence that he was trying to 
effect a change through intimidation.31 
The second distinguishing fact was the actual content of the 
two communications. Jeffries clearly indicated a demand in his 
video. The video not only contained threats to the judge but also 
had frequent and specific references to the upcoming court date 
and urged the judge to “do the right thing.”32 These statements 
27 Id. at 1496. 
28 Id. 
29 United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1995) aff'd 
sub nom., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
30 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494–95. 
31 United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 481 (6th Cir. 2012). 
32 Id. at 476–77. 
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were evidence that Jeffries was asking the judge to rule in his favor 
at the hearing.33 In contrast, Alkhabaz’s story contained no 
indication that he was trying to obtain something by 
communicating a threat.34 
Therefore, because Jeffries’ video included a request and was 
disseminated in an attempt to reach the judicial officer, it was 
considered a true threat. In contrast, Alkhabaz’s story did not 
contain a demand or request and was only posted online and 
emailed to an unrelated third party; it therefore lacked the requisite 
intent to be a true threat. 
 
D.  The Sixth Circuit’s True Threat Test Combines Subjective and 
Objective Standards 
 
The true threat test, as applied in Jeffries, is substantially 
similar to a subjective intent requirement. The test applied by the 
court is whether a reasonable person would perceive the 
communication as a true threat.35 
The test can be broken into two elements, although the Sixth 
Circuit does not frame it in this manner. The first step is to 
determine whether the threat is a true threat, as required by the 
First Amendment in Watts v. United States.36 The second step is to 
consider whether a reasonable person would perceive the 
communication as a serious threat to inflict bodily harm. A threat 
must satisfy both steps to sustain a conviction. 
 The true threat analysis employed by the Sixth Circuit 
incorporates several subjective factors. Alkhabaz’s use of the test 
asks whether the threat was made to further a purpose or goal.37 
And the jury instruction in Jeffries, although explicitly stating that 
there was no subjective intent requirement, told the jury to 
consider whether a reasonable person would find that “the 
communication was done to effect some change or achieve some 
33 Id. at 481. 
34 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496. 
35 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478. 
36 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1969). 
37 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1495. 
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goal through intimidation.”38 Whether the threat was made to 
achieve a goal considers the defendant’s subjective intent. 
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit requires objective proof of subjective 
intent. This approach is not substantively different from simply 
requiring subjective intent. 
Intent is by its very nature subjective. But this fact does not 
mean that evidence of intent must be subjective. For example, in 
many areas of criminal law, the jury can find intent without any 
subjective evidence because it can infer intent from objective 
evidence.39 If a defendant uses a deadly weapon on a victim, the 
jury may infer an intent to kill, even absent any subjective 
evidence about the defendant’s state of mind.40 Accordingly, 
subjective intent is often proven with objective evidence. 
Therefore, despite the Sixth Circuit’s stated rejections of the Ninth 
Circuit’s subjective intent requirement,41 in practice the two tests 
lead to the same results in most situations.  
 
IV. APPLYING SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE INTENT  
REQUIREMENTS TO YOUTUBE VIDEOS 
 
Subjective and objective intent requirements often lead to the 
same outcome. If a communication is objectively threatening, it is 
more likely that the communication was intended to be a threat. 
And if there is evidence that the creator of the communication 
intended to threaten the recipient, it is more likely that the message 
will be viewed as objectively threatening.  
However, a subjective intent requirement prevents § 875(c) 
from chilling protected speech. With this requirement, § 875(c) 
only reaches threats directed at specific individuals or groups. And 
YouTube users may submit content that contains threatening 
language without fear of liability, as it is not directed at specific 
individuals. So what do these requirements mean for threats posted 
on widely broadcast Internet channels such as YouTube? 
38 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 477.  
39 See 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN, NANCY HOLLANDER & THERESA M. 
DUNCAN, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 3:17 (15th ed. 2013). 
40 Id. 
41 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496.  
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A.  Objective Intent Requirement 
 
Holding the threat to an objective standard means that the 
language of the threat must be sufficiently threatening, given the 
context, that a reasonable observer would find it to be a serious 
expression of an intent to cause harm. For example, if a YouTube 
video contains only an innocuous message, the video would not 
meet the objective standard, regardless of the creator’s intent. But 
if the content of the communication is threatening, under a purely 
objective standard, the defendant’s testimony about his intentions 
would not be relevant.  
 
B.  Subjective Intent Requirement 
 
Requiring subjective intent means that there must be evidence 
that the creator of the message intended to threaten. This was the 
situation in Alkhabaz, where the content of the defendant’s story 
met the objective standard but the circumstances demonstrated that 
he did not send the communication in order to further a purpose 
through intimidation.42 In terms of a YouTube video, this means 
that a video may contain threatening language as long as there is 
no evidence that the video’s creator intended to threaten someone. 
Jeffries indicates that a video directed toward the threatened 
individual, or circumstances, such as demands for specific action, 
that show intent to threaten, are evidence of subjective intent. 
C.  Practical Differences Between the Sixth and Ninth Circuit 
Approaches. 
 
The practical differences between the approaches of the two 
circuits are evidentiary, not in the substance of what a conviction 
requires. But the Sixth Circuit’s true threat analysis limits even 
these evidentiary differences. In the Ninth Circuit, a defendant’s 
statements about his intent will always be relevant in determining 
whether the communication was a threat. In the Sixth Circuit, the 
defendant’s testimony regarding his intent will have less relevance, 
42 Id. 
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though it could still be relevant when determining whether the 




While the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit use ostensibly 
different tests when analyzing cases under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the 
elements of each test are essentially the same. The Ninth Circuit 
requires both subjective and objective intent to threaten in order to 
uphold a conviction. The Sixth Circuit not only requires objective 
intent, but also requires the threat to be a true threat, and this true 
threat test incorporates analysis of subjective intent to threaten.  
Therefore, there is no substantive difference between the 
requirements for a § 875(c) conviction under the ostensibly 
different tests of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits. In either circuit, the 
government must prove both objective expression of serious intent 
to cause bodily harm and subjective intent to threaten.  
In the context of a YouTube video or other widely broadcast 
communication, § 875(c) is violated only when there is evidence 
that its creator had a subjective intent to threaten. In the YouTube 
context, evidence of subjective intent can be efforts to direct the 
video at a specific individual or group, or to accomplish a goal 
through intimidation. This subjective requirement mitigates 
potential chilling effects on speech while allowing the government 




 When advising clients about potential criminal liability for 
YouTube videos or similar communications, keep in mind 
both the objective and subjective requirements. A client’s 
video may be objectively threatening but not directed at 
any individual, and thus not subject to liability. 
 When practicing in the Sixth Circuit, frame any defense 
based on lack of subjective intent to threaten in terms of a 
true threat analysis. The court is more likely to reject an 
argument framed around the subjective intent requirement. 
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